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Abstract 
The global financial crisis and its aftermath heightened awareness of the role of credit frictions in 
affecting aggregate economic performance. An important question is whether capital is being allocated 
to its most productive uses. This paper examines the process through which credit is reallocated across 
surviving UK businesses over 2004-2012 using the methodology developed by Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1992) for the analysis of job reallocation. We find that credit reallocation among survivors is intense, 
and that it primarily occurs across firms similar in size, industry, or location. The results suggest that 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis has been characterized by persistently increased levels of 
credit reallocation. However, the evolution of the intensity of credit reallocation after the crisis varies 
greatly by firm size as measured by sales, with firms in the middle of the distribution driving the overall 
elevated levels of reallocation in the post-crisis period. When focusing on the sub-sample of larger firms 
we use to examine the efficiency of the reallocation process, reallocation flows appear to have decreased 
to levels lower than pre-crisis after a sharp increase in 2007-2008. In terms of efficiency developments, 
we find that the productivity slowdown of 2008-2009 does not coincide with a deterioration of allocative 
efficiency along three crucial dimensions of firm performance, namely TFP, labour productivity, and 
default risk. However, the credit crunch of 2008-2009 coincides with a slowdown of year-on-year 
efficiency improvements, which persists until the end of the sample period. This raises the prospect that 
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1 Introduction
Labour productivity growth slowed sharply following the global financial crisis of
2007-2008 in many advanced economies. The UK was particularly badly hit and
GDP per hour worked only recovered to its pre-crisis levels in 2017. The productiv-
ity decline was accompanied by a fall in business investment that was significantly
larger than in previous recessions (Benito et al., 2010). There are many factors that
could explain the decline in investment such as weak demand, pessimism over future
TFP growth and uncertainty. But the financial crisis also led to restrictions in bank
lending to non-financial corporations. Bank lending to the corporate sector in the
UK continued to contract long after the acute phase of the credit crisis. Work on the
role of credit supply and its allocation across firms in the UK remains sparse. Evi-
dence on the productivity decline points to a role played by the adverse credit supply
shock. Franklin et al. (2015) use financial statement data for a set of UK firms and
information on the identity of firms’ lenders in the pre-crisis period to identify the
negative impact of the contraction in credit supply on labour productivity, wages
and the capital intensity of production at the firm level. Besley et al. (2019) study
the implications of credit frictions for aggregate output and productivity through
the lens of default risk. From a lender’s perspective, the main reason for declining
an application for a loan or overdraft is that they judge that the potential borrower
is unlikely to be able to service the debt. Risk perceptions by banks have increased
significantly since the financial crisis. The authors examine how this translates into
output and productivity losses. They estimate that credit frictions caused output
losses of around 27.5% per year on average over the period 2005-2013. Output losses
due to credit frictions are much larger for SMEs (firms with under 250 employees).
They stand at 32.6% per year on average, compared to 20% for large firms. This is
consistent with SMEs being on average perceived as riskier and accordingly facing
tighter credit constraints. The overall losses increased substantially following the
global financial crisis, accounting for over half of the productivity fall between 2008
and 2009, and persisted thereafter for smaller (although not larger) firms. The au-
thors also find that output losses are overwhelmingly due to a lower overall capital
stock rather than a misallocation of credit across firms (TFP losses). Neverthe-
less, misallocation caused an annual 2% loss of output on average over the period
2005-2013 - pointing to the fact that the allocation of credit across firms plays a
role in aggregate economic performance in addition to the overall volume of credit
employed by the business sector.1 Despite the fact that losses from misallocation are
1The idea that the allocation of resources, and not just their overall volume, plays a role
for aggregate economic performance is explored in e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002),
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relatively small, their time series pattern indicates that misallocation has worsened
since the financial crisis (See Figure 1).
Figure 1: TFP losses due to misallocation of credit (%)
Source: Besley, Roland, and Van Reenen (2019).
In light of the importance of the allocation of resources across firms for aggregate
economic performance, we study the dynamic process of credit reallocation among
surviving businesses in the UK over the period 2004-2012. We follow Herrera et al.
(2011) in adopting the statistical methodology developed by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) and Davis et al. (1996) for the measurement of job reallocation. Our aim is
to provide a descriptive picture of credit creation, destruction, and reallocation in
the UK, which can inform researchers and provide guidance for models that investi-
gate the interaction between financial factors and aggregate economic performance.
We compute inter-firm flows of credit and compare their empirical properties with
those of the inter-firm flows of sales. We examine the cross-sectional properties of
credit reallocation and how it varies across sectors, firm size classes, and geogra-
phies. We then turn to the time series properties of credit reallocation, with a focus
on the Great Recession and its aftermath. We examine whether the financial crisis
stimulated or depressed the reallocation of credit, and explore whether reallocation
has been efficiency enhancing. Following Hyun and Minetti (2019), we construct
an index for the efficiency of the allocation of credit adapting the index for the
efficiency of investment allocation in Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2007). We
examine “efficiency” along four dimensions, namely the profitability, TFP, labour
productivity, and default risk of the firms receiving credit.
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2014), Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and
Scarpetta (2013), Asker et al. (2014), Gopinath et al. (2017).
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We focus on debt (credit from firms’ perspective), which represents the main form of
external finance for UK businesses. The UK is a nation of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). SMEs accounted for 99.9% of all private sector businesses at
the start of 2017, and 60% of all private sector employment. Unlike larger firms
which can have recourse to other sources of finance, for instance by issuing bonds
or equities, SMEs are more likely to be constrained by the availability of credit. In
2010, only around 2% of SMEs used external equity as a source of finance (BIS,
2010). Armstrong et al. (2013) show that SMEs have faced a very challenging en-
vironment for accessing credit after the financial crisis and during the subsequent
recession. We rely on Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database to collect firm-level data on
debt (both short-term and long-term) and sales. We also use Orbis to collect data
that enables us to estimate firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) and labour
productivity for a sub-sample of firms.
The paper documents that in every year of the sample period 2004-2012, inter-firm
credit flows exceed those needed to accommodate net credit changes. We find that
the reallocation of short-term debt is on average more intense than the reallocation
of long-term debt. Credit reallocation is a continuous, quantitatively important pro-
cess. However, we find that the reallocation of credit among surviving firms is less
intense than that of sales. We find that large changes are an important proportion
of all credit changes, suggesting that firms face non-convex adjustment costs. The
data also reveal that on average the intensity of credit reallocation among surviving
businesses in the UK varies somewhat across industries, size classes, public versus
private status, and geographies. However, the reallocation of credit within groups
of firms similar in size, industry, private versus public status, or location is more
intense than the reallocation across groups. Focusing on the time series patterns,
we find a sharp increase in credit reallocation from 2007-2008 onwards. Credit cre-
ation slumped in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, whereas credit destruction increased -
resulting in negative credit changes in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. Credit creation
recovered from 2010-2011 onwards to reach levels similar to the peak observed in
2007-2008 by the end of 2012. Despite the fact that credit destruction remained
at levels higher than pre-crisis through to the end of the sample period, the credit
recovery (positive net credit changes) is visible from 2010-2011 onwards. In the over-
all sample, credit reallocation remained noticeably more intense in the aftermath of
the financial crisis, up to the end of our sample period. However, the evolution of
the intensity of the reallocation process post-crisis varies greatly by size categories,
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with larger firms (defined as being in the fourth quartile of the sales distribution)
experiencing a decrease in the intensity of the reallocation process after the initial
increase of 2007-2008. When focusing on the sub-sample of larger firms we use
to examine the efficiency of the reallocation process, reallocation flows appear to
have decreased to levels lower than pre-crisis after an increase in 2007-2008. When
looking at efficiency, we find that reallocation was efficiency enhancing before the
financial crisis. The credit shock of 2008-2009 does not coincide with a deterio-
ration of allocative efficiency along three dimensions of firm performance, namely
TFP, labour productivity, and default risk. However, it coincides with a slowdown
of year-on-year efficiency improvements, which persists until the end of the sample
period. This raises the prospect that the financial crisis might have undermined the
ability of lenders to channel credit to its most productive uses.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources and
methodology. Section 3 investigates the magnitude and cross-sectional properties of
credit reallocation. Section 4 characterizes the time series properties of reallocation,
with a focus on the Great Recession and the efficiency of the reallocation process.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Data
Our main source of data is Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database, which provides in-
formation on the balance sheets and income statements of UK businesses. Being
interested in firms that demand rather than supply credit, we remove financial firms
from our sample.2 As opposed to Herrera et al. (2011) who focus on publicly traded
firms in the US, our dataset encompasses both private and public firms. This is im-
portant as the UK, like the US, is a nation of small businesses, which are typically
also private businesses. SMEs accounted for 99.9% of all private sector businesses
at the start of 2017, and 60% of all private sector employment. On the downside,
we only have access to a short time period with satisfactory data coverage, namely
2004-2012, which prevents us from exploring the cyclical properties of credit real-
location. We collect data on total debt (credit from a firm’s perspective), as well
as a breakdown of total debt into short-term and long-term debt. It is important
to make a distinction between short-term and long-term credit. Short-term debt
2We identify financial firms as those with two-digit code 40 according to the Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS).
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mostly provides working capital that enables firms to bridge the time lag between
the financing of current business operations (e.g. payment of wages) and the ac-
crual of returns. By contrast, long-term debt typically finances long-term plans
(e.g. capital investment). To the extent that long-term investment is one of the
main determinants of firms’ output and productivity, the allocation of long-term
debt plays a more important role for aggregate economic performance. We collect
data on sales in order to examine how quantitatively important the process of credit
reallocation is, compared to the reallocation of sales.3 We deflate the data using an
implied GDP deflator calculated for each two digit UK Standard Industrial Classi-
fication code using ONS data.
A caveat of the analysis is that our data requirements do not allow us to work
with the entire population of firms in Orbis. We start with 5.6m observations on
the growth of total debt, but are left with only 0.9m when we condition on ob-
serving the growth of total debt, short-term debt, long-term debt, and sales.4 The
data requirements mean that our sample will be biased towards larger firms as these
have better data coverage in Orbis. In addition, when we focus on the time series
patterns and the Great Recession, we exploit data on firms’ productivity (both TFP
and labour productivity) and default risk. This imposes further data requirements
that shrink the size of the sample. To generate estimates of labour productivity and
TFP, we follow Gal (2013). Specifically, we use the “value added method” of Gal
(2013) to estimate labour productivity and the “Wooldridge method” (Woolridge,
2009) to estimate TFP5. Due to the data requirements of the estimation procedure,
we are only able to estimate productivity for a small sub-sample of firms (250K
observations).6 Because larger firms have better data coverage in Orbis, this will
introduce a further bias towards larger firms. Data on default risk is taken from
Besley et al. (2019) who use S&P’s PD Model and CreditPro to estimate a time-
varying probability of default at the firm-level with Orbis data. The estimates of
default risk represent the probability that a firm will default on its debt obligations
within one year.
In addition to limited data availability for the data items of interest, we face se-
vere measurement issues regarding firm entry and exit. Specifically, we do not have
3There is not enough data on employment in Orbis to enable us to compare the reallocation of
credit to the reallocation of jobs.
4Appendix Table 1 gives the number of observations per year in our samples.
5We use the prodest command in Stata (Mollisi, 2017).
6Appendix Table 1 gives the number of observations per year in our samples.
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access to the historical version of the Orbis database and lack information on why
firms enter or exit our dataset. Firms that enter our dataset could either be genuine
entrants (new firms) or existing firms on which the data we require was previously
unrecorded in Orbis. A comparison between the annual numbers of firms that enter
our dataset each year and ONS statistics on newly created firms clearly indicates
that the main reason for new entries in our dataset is most likely linked to data
recording issues rather than genuine entry. Therefore, treating the debt of exist-
ing firms as new debt would lead to severe overestimation of credit creation. To
avoid counting the debt of existing firms that enter the dataset as credit creation,
we ignore firms that newly enter the dataset in each year. This means that we
ignore credit creation resulting from entry. For consistency and because Orbis does
not provide any information on why a firm exits the dataset, we also abstract from
credit destruction due to firm exit. In other words, we focus on surviving firms.
This will lead to an underestimation of credit flows, but enables us to know exactly
what we are measuring.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Measurement of credit flows
To measure credit flows, we adopt the methodology of Herrera et al. (2011), who
follow the methodology developed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis et
al. (1996) for the measurement of job flows. Denote with cf,t the average debt of
a firm f across periods t− 1 and t. For a group s of firms this average is similarly
denoted Cs,t. The growth rate of debt for firm f is denoted gf,t. It is defined as the
first difference of debt divided by cf,t. This takes a minimum value of -2 for firms
that pay off all of their debt and a maximum value of 2 for firms going from no debt
to some debt.7
As in Herrera et al. (2011), we consider five measures of aggregate credit flows.
Given a set s of firms, credit creation at time t (POSs,t) is calculated as the weighted
sum of the debt growth rates of firms which became more indebted (firms with rising













7As explained in Herrera et al. (2011), gf,t is a monotonic transformation of the percentage
change and roughly coincides with it for small growth rates. It involves two crucial benefits relative
to the percentage change. Specifically, it is bounded and symmetric around zero.
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Analogously, credit destruction (NEGs,t) is calculated as the weighted sum of the
absolute values of the debt growth rates of firms which became less indebted (firms









Credit reallocation (SUMs,t) is defined as the sum of credit creation and credit
destruction.
SUMs,t = POSs,t + NEGs,t (3)
Net credit change (NETs,t) is defined as credit creation minus credit destruction.
NETs,t = POSs,t −NEGs,t (4)
Excess credit reallocation (EXCs,t) is defined as the reallocation in excess of the
absolute value of net credit change (NETs,t). It measures credit reallocation in
excess of the minimum required to accommodate net credit changes.
EXCs,t = SUMs,t − |NETs,t| (5)
2.2.2 Efficiency
To examine whether reallocation is efficiency enhancing, we follow Hyun and Minetti
(2019) and adapt the index for the efficiency of investment allocation in Galindo,
Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2007). The index is a ratio. In the numerator, in year t, it
includes the weighted sum of profitabilities (sales to capital ratios) of the firms, with
the weight for each firm given by the contribution of the firm’s debt to the total





. In the denominator, it includes the sum of the
profitabilities (sales to capital ratios) of the same firms weighted by the contribution





. For example, using




















Capital reallocation from unprofitable to profitable firms is a key source of produc-
tivity growth. A value of the index greater than one signals that credit was allocated
more efficiently in year t than if the credit distribution had remained the same as
in year t− 1. In addition to looking at profitability, we exploit data on default risk
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(repayment probabilities), TFP, and labour productivity. This index will help us
explore the question of whether the financial crisis enhanced the ability of lenders
to reallocate credit towards firms with higher profitability, higher productivity, and
lower default risk.
3 Magnitude and Cross-Sectional Properties
3.1 Magnitude and Persistence
Table 1 presents our estimates of average credit creation, credit destruction, net
credit change, credit reallocation and excess credit reallocation for the period 2004-
2012.8 The average rate of total credit creation over the sample period is 18.7%,
while average credit destruction is 13.6%. Hence the average net change in credit
was 5.1% and the average credit reallocation was 32.3%. We find that aggregate
credit flows are much larger than the net flows of credit as shown by excess credit
reallocation averaging 26.1%. Table 1 also breaks down total credit into short-term
and long-term debt. We find that average short-term debt flows are larger than flows
of long-term debt. This is true for creation, destruction, net change, reallocation
and excess reallocation. For example, average credit reallocation over the period
was 46.2% for short-term debt compared to 34.3% for long-term debt.
Table 1: Average Credit Flows and Comparison With Flows of Sales
Average Flows Observations POS NEG NET SUM EXC P
Total Credit (04-12) 898,658 0.187 0.136 0.051 0.323 0.261 0.522
Long Term Credit (04-12) 898,658 0.195 0.147 0.048 0.343 0.271 0.502
Short Term Credit (04-12) 898,658 0.260 0.202 0.057 0.462 0.387 0.499
Sales (04-12) 898,658 0.314 0.272 0.042 0.586 0.282 0.440
Notes: The sample conditions on the availability of data on the growth of total debt, long-term
debt, short-term debt and sales.
Table 1 also contains our estimates of flows for sales, computed using the same
methodology. A comparison with credit flows can help us ascertain how economi-
cally important credit flows are. For sales, the average rate of creation (destruction)
equals 31.4% (27.2%), the average reallocation 58.6%, the average net change is
4.2%, while the average excess reallocation is 28.2%. The net flows of credit are
8Table 2 in the Appendix shows that the results are fairly robust when we work with the sub-
sample of firms for which we can obtain estimates of default risk, TFP and labour productivity.
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slightly larger than those of sales. However, the reallocation of credit is on average
less intense than that of sales among surviving UK businesses.
We are also interested in whether changes in credit are due to temporary or persis-
tent changes in debt. To ascertain which is the case, we use the same measure of





growth rate t to t + 2




Persistence is highest when Pf,t = 1 , that is changes from t to t+1 last an additional
year. And it is lowest when Pf,t = 0, which is when debt changes do not carry over at
all to the next year. The results are in the last column of Table 1. The persistence of
flows of total credit is 0.522, suggesting that a sizable proportion of the yearly flows
are due to temporary firm-level debt changes. We break down the results according
to whether debt is short-term or long-term and find that changes in long-term debt
are not substantially more persistent than changes in short-term debt.
3.2 Adjustment Costs
An extensive literature argues that firms adjust labour and capital in a lumpy way
(see, e.g., Davis et al., 2006). If firms face sizable non-convex adjustment costs,
they will prefer to make infrequent and large adjustments rather than frequent and
small ones. Because non-convex adjustment costs are well-known in the theory of
investment of the firm, it is interesting to see whether such an argument applies to
credit, especially long-term credit which finances such investment. Therefore, we
explore to what extent large credit changes contribute to credit reallocation. To
explore this, we follow Herrera et al. (2011) and define firms with large changes as
having |gf,t| > 0.18. Table 2 reports our estimates of credit flows attributable to
large changes.
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Table 2: Average Flows Due to Large Changes
Average Flows Observations POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Total Credit (04-13) 477,756 0.158 0.122 0.037 0.280 0.232
Long Term Credit (04-13) 527,861 0.168 0.133 0.035 0.300 0.246
Short Term Credit (04-13) 653,481 0.238 0.190 0.048 0.428 0.359
Sales (04-13) 737,984 0.295 0.263 0.032 0.558 0.255
Notes: The sample conditions on the availability of data on the growth of total debt, long-term
debt, short-term debt and sales.
We find that large changes are an important proportion of all credit changes. Specif-
ically, 86.7% of total average reallocation is due to large changes. This is lower than
the percentage of sales reallocation due to large changes (95.3%). This suggests the
presence of non-convex adjustment costs.
Figure 2 plots reallocation due to large changes against total reallocation over time.
They appear to track each other closely. This is in line with the results of Herrera et
al. (2011), who highlight that this echoes the finding of Gourio and Kashyap (2007)
that large investment changes dominate the variation in aggregate investment.
Figure 2: Average Flows Due to Large Changes
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3.3 Cross-Sectional Properties and Within-Between Group
Reallocation
In this section, we examine whether credit reallocation varies according to a number
of dimensions of interest, including sectors, size (proxied by sales), private versus
public status, and geographies. We also examine whether the reallocation of credit
occurs within groups of similar firms or between groups of firms. The reallocation
of credit may stem from the reshuffling of credit within groups of firms with similar
characteristics (same sector, same size class, same geography, etc.) or from the
reallocation of credit across groups. Because the factors driving within-group and
across-groups reallocation might be very different, it is useful to disentangle the
contribution of the within-group and the cross-group reallocation. Following Herrera
et al. (2011), we use the index of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) to measure to what






where s = 1...S denotes the groups. If in group s there is only credit creation or
destruction, SUMs,t = |NETs,t|. If this occurs for every group, then Wt = 0. There-
fore, Wt = 0 means that all reallocation occurs between groups of firms whereas
Wt = 1 means that all reallocation occurs within groups of firms. Table 3 presents
average flows calculated for different groups of firms, alongside the corresponding
values of this index.
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Table 3: Cross-Sectional Properties (2004-2012)
Observations POS NEG NET SUM EXC W
Panel A: Sectors
Manufacturing 113,103 0.184 0.150 0.034 0.334 0.274 0.790
Services 387,590 0.190 0.152 0.038 0.341 0.266
Rest of the economy 397,965 0.184 0.119 0.066 0.303 0.230
Panel B: Sales quartiles
0 - 25% 224,665 0.188 0.120 0.067 0.308 0.241 0.820
25% - 50% 224,664 0.167 0.147 0.021 0.314 0.277
50% - 75% 224,665 0.178 0.169 0.009 0.348 0.296
75% - 100% 224,664 0.195 0.141 0.054 0.336 0.259
Panel C: Private versus public firms
Private firms 895,644 0.187 0.141 0.047 0.328 0.272 0.672
Public Firms 3,014 0.179 0.092 0.086 0.271 0.126
Panel D: Regions
England 239,471 0.188 0.124 0.064 0.313 0.244 0.725
Scotland 17,609 0.182 0.164 0.018 0.347 0.281
Wales 7,499 0.170 0.101 0.069 0.272 0.180
Northern Ireland 5,400 0.205 0.109 0.097 0.314 0.189
Notes: Panels A, B, and C condition on the availability of data on the growth of total debt, long-
term debt, short-term debt and sales. Panel D works with a more limited sample of firms for which
location data is available.
Panel A of Table 3 partitions the dataset into three broad sectoral categories, namely
manufacturing, services, and the rest of the economy. The results show that sig-
nificant flows of credit creation and destruction coexist within all sectors, but that
the intensity of credit reallocation does not vary much across sectors. In addition,
we find that on average most of the reallocation occurs within sectors (average
W=0.790). However, when we consider industries at a more disaggregated level (3
digits), the average W index goes down to 0.676. Nevertheless, this still implies
that the majority of credit reallocation occurs within industries. In other words, it
is generated by intra-sectoral heterogeneity in firms’ debt dynamics as opposed to
sectoral shocks or the different impact of aggregate shocks on sectors.
Panel B breaks down the dataset into four size categories based on sales (4 quartiles).
The results indicate that on average the intensity of credit reallocation does not vary
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hugely across size categories as proxied by sales, although it is slightly higher for
larger firms (quartiles 3 and 4). In addition, we find that most reallocation occurs
within size quartiles (average W=0.820). This suggests that the reallocation activ-
ity in the credit market goes beyond the flights to quality from small to large firms
typically observed during recession episodes.
In Panel C, we examine whether credit flows differ depending on whether firms
are publicly listed or private. Public firms have a much higher net credit change
than private firms on average (8.6% against 4.7%, respectively). This is driven by
lower credit destruction for public firms. In addition, private firms have a higher
average for credit reallocation than public firms, 32.8% against 27.1%. However, we
find that on average most of the reallocation occurs within groups of firms (average
W=0.672), although to a lesser extent than when we break down the data by broad
sector or size. This might capture an element of flight to quality from private to
publicly listed firms.
Finally, in Panel D we explore the geographical distribution of credit reallocation.
The estimates show that all regions of the UK experience intense credit reallocation
on average. However, the intensity varies geographically, with Scotland exhibiting
the highest average credit reallocation of the four countries and Wales the lowest.
Finally, we find that the majority of credit is reallocated within the countries that
make up the United Kingdom (average W=0.725).
4 Time Series Properties and the Great Recession
We now look at how credit reallocation and net credit changes change over time,
with particular interest in looking at how the Great Recession may have altered
credit flows. Table 4 presents the yearly average credit flows and Figure 3 presents
a graphic depiction of the results. Here we make use of the full sample, i.e. just
condition on data availability on the growth of total debt, in order to come closer
to the aggregate picture.
The yearly data reveal the simultaneous presence of large positive and negative
credit flows at any phase of the business cycle. The credit crunch is visible in 2008-
2009 and 2009-2010. Credit creation slumped in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, while
credit destruction increased simultaneously. These patterns resulted in negative net
credit changes in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. Credit creation recovered from 2010-
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2011 onwards to reach levels similar to the peak observed in 2007-2008 by the end
of 2012. Despite the fact that credit destruction remained at levels higher than
pre-crisis through to the end of the sample period, the credit recovery is visible
from 2010-2011 onwards in the shape of positive net credit changes. Credit real-
location increased noticeably in 2007-2008 and remained elevated in the post-crisis
years. This suggests that the reallocation process was not hindered by the Great
Recession, on the contrary.
Table 4: Average credit flows over time
Observations POS NEG NET SUM EXC
2004-2005 657,088 0.089 0.125 -0.036 0.214 0.178
2005-2006 720,081 0.114 0.083 0.031 0.197 0.165
2006-2007 656,092 0.118 0.099 0.019 0.217 0.197
2007-2008 628,970 0.203 0.154 0.049 0.357 0.309
2008-2009 680,095 0.162 0.165 -0.003 0.328 0.325
2009-2010 701,743 0.140 0.187 -0.047 0.327 0.280
2010-2011 739,952 0.181 0.137 0.044 0.318 0.275
2011-2012 784,394 0.208 0.145 0.063 0.352 0.289
Notes: The sample conditions on the availability of data on the growth of total debt.
Figure 3: Average credit flows over time
Notes: The sample conditions on the availability of data on the growth of total debt.
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The evolution of the intensity of the reallocation process post-crisis appears to vary
greatly by size category. Figure (4) breaks down the sample into four sales quartiles
and shows the intensity of the reallocation process over time. All four quartiles
experienced an increase in credit reallocation in 2007-2008, although the increase
was much milder for the largest firms. After the crisis, the smallest and largest firms
(quartiles 1 and 4) witnessed a decrease in reallocation, returning to pre-crisis levels
or below. By contrast, reallocation remained elevated for firms in the middle of the
distribution (quartiles 2 and 3) until the end of the sample period.
Figure 4: Average credit flows over time by sales quartile
When we condition on observing the growth of total debt and sales, as well as
default risk, TFP, and labour productivity - which is the sample we use to examine
the efficiency of the reallocation process, reallocation again increases sharply in
2007-2008, but then drops to levels lower than those observed pre-crisis by the end
of 2011 (Table 5 and Figure 5). Because of the data requirements, the sub-sample
is likely to omit the smallest firms and to be biased towards the largest ones with
better data coverage in Orbis.
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Table 5: Average credit flows over time
Observations POS NEG NET SUM EXC
2004-2005 33,018 0.194 0.118 0.076 0.312 0.236
2005-2006 31,651 0.169 0.131 0.038 0.300 0.262
2006-2007 29,475 0.232 0.066 0.166 0.298 0.132
2007-2008 28,831 0.259 0.093 0.166 0.352 0.187
2008-2009 28,798 0.171 0.117 0.054 0.288 0.234
2009-2010 31,826 0.135 0.165 -0.030 0.300 0.270
2010-2011 32,875 0.160 0.082 0.078 0.242 0.164
2011-2012 31,949 0.157 0.099 0.058 0.257 0.199
Notes: This table conditions on observing the growth of total debt and sales, as well as default
risk, TFP, and labour productivity.
Figure 5: Average credit flows over time
Notes: The sample conditions on observing the growth of total debt and sales, as well as default
risk, TFP, and labour productivity.
While they are useful, Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 3 and 5 say nothing about whether
the reallocation process is associated with improvements in efficiency, i.e. whether
lenders gained better ability to match their funds with efficient and productive firms.
To explore this question, we estimate the efficiency index given by Equation (6)
using data on profitability (sales to capital ratio), repayment probabilities (equal to
1 minus probabilities of default), TFP, and labour productivity. We are only able to
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do this for the sub-sample of Table 5. A value of the index greater than one signals
that credit was allocated more efficiently in year t than if the credit distribution had
remained the same as in year t − 1. Figure 6 presents the estimates for the years
2006-2012.9
Figure 6: Efficiency indices
The results on default risk, TFP, and labour productivity follow a similar pattern.
The figure suggests that before the crisis, the efficiency of reallocation improved from
one year to the next. Specifically, the value of the index is larger than 1 (It > 1) and
increasing over time. It jumped down in 2009, but did not fall below 1. This indicates
that the credit shock of 2008-2009 does not coincide with a deterioration of allocative
efficiency along the three dimensions of firm performance we examine. However, the
figure shows that the rate of increase in efficiency post-crisis is lower than in the
pre-crisis years. To illustrate this, we fit two separate polynomials of order 2 to
9Because of data requirements on debt growth and lagged values, we cannot estimate the index
for the years 2004 and 2005.
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the data points in 2006-2008 and 2009-2012. Despite the indices remaining above 1
after 2009, the improvements in efficiency from year to year are less marked than in
the pre-crisis period. This indicates that the financial crisis might have decreased
the ability of lenders to direct credit to its most productive uses. The results on
profitability are a bit mixed. There was a deterioration in efficiency in 2009 (with
the index falling below 1), followed by a return to year-on-year improvements similar
to the pre-crisis period. However, there was a slowdown in 2012. The results on
default risk echo concerns about the “rise of zombie firms” (see e.g. Banerjee and
Hofmann, 2018), defined as firms that are unable to cover debt servicing costs from
current profits over an extended period. Although this is not a dimension of firm
performance that we explicitly examine, zombie firms are by definition more likely
to default. A less vigorous reallocation of credit from firms with high default risk
to firms with low default risk would be a symptom of an increased prevalence of
zombies. In turn, zombies are less productive, hence the results on TFP and labour
productivity could also be partly driven by this phenomenon. However, uncovering
how much of the results are driven by zombies is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusions
The period following the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 heightened awareness
of the role of credit frictions in affecting aggregate economic efficiency, especially
productivity. There have been concerns that capital might not be allocated to its
most productive uses. To examine this question, we study the process through
which credit is reallocated across surviving UK businesses over 2004-2012 using the
methodology developed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) for the analysis of job
reallocation. We find that credit reallocation is a continuous and quantitatively
important process. Inter-firm credit flows exceed those needed to accommodate net
credit changes. We find that large changes are an important proportion of all credit
changes, suggesting that firms face non-convex adjustment costs. The data also re-
veal that on average the intensity of credit reallocation among surviving businesses
in the UK varies somewhat across industries, size classes, public versus private sta-
tus, and geographies. However, the reallocation of credit within groups of firms
similar in size, industry, private versus public status, or location is more intense
than the reallocation across groups.
Focusing on the Great Recession, we find a sharp increase in credit reallocation from
2007-2008 onwards. Credit creation slumped in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, whereas
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credit destruction increased - resulting in negative net credit changes in 2008-2009
and 2009-2010. Credit creation recovered from 2010-2011 onwards to reach levels
similar to the peak observed in 2007-2008. Despite the fact that credit destruction
remained at levels higher than pre-crisis through to the end of the sample period,
the credit recovery is visible from 2010-2011 onwards. Credit reallocation remained
noticeably more intense in the aftermath of the financial crisis than in the pre-crisis
years, up to the end of our sample period. However, the intensity of the reallocation
process after the crisis shows variation across firm size classes as measured by sales,
with firms in the middle of the distribution driving the elevated levels of reallocation
in the post-crisis period. When we condition on observing the growth of total debt
and sales, as well as default risk, TFP, and labour productivity - which is the sam-
ple we use to examine the efficiency of the reallocation process, reallocation again
increases in 2007-2008, but then drops to levels lower than those observed pre-crisis.
Because of the data requirements, the sub-sample is biased towards larger firms
with better reporting in Orbis. When looking at efficiency, we find that the credit
shock of 2008-2009 does not coincide with a deterioration of allocative efficiency
along three dimensions of firm performance, namely TFP, labour productivity, and
default risk. However, it coincides with a slowdown of year-on-year efficiency im-
provements, which persists until the end of the sample period. This raises the
prospect that the financial crisis might have undermined the ability of lenders to
channel credit to its most productive uses.
Two important caveats of our analysis have to be kept in mind. Because of limited
data availability, our sample is limited in size. The data requirements mean that
our sample will be biased towards larger firms as these have better data coverage
in Orbis. In addition, we are unable to take entry and exit properly into account
and therefore focus on surviving businesses. This means that our estimates of credit




Armstrong, Angus, Phillip Davis, Iana Liadze and Cinzia Rienzo (2013) Evaluating
changes in bank lending to SMEs over 2001-2012, National Institute for Economic
and Social Research Discussion Paper 408.
Asker, John, Allan Collard-Wexler and Jan De Loecker (2014) Dynamic Inputs and
Resource (Mis)Allocation, Journal of Political Economy, 122(5), pp.1013-1063.
Banerjee, Ryan, and Boris Hofmann (2018) The Rise of Zombie Firms: Causes and
Consequences, BIS Quarterly Review September 2018.
Bartelsman, Eric, Haltiwanger, John and Scarpetta, Stefano (2013) Cross-Country
Differences in Productivity: The Role of Allocation and Selection, American Eco-
nomic Review, 103, pp.305-334.
Benito, Andrew, Katherine Neiss, Simon Price, and Lukasz Rachel (2010) The im-
pact of the financial crisis on supply, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2010 Q2,
pp.104-114.
Besley, Timothy, Isabelle Roland, and John Van Reenen (2019) The Aggregate
Consequences of Default Risk: Evidence from Firm-level Data, Working Paper.
Besley, Timothy and John Van Reenen (2013) Investing for Prosperity, London:
LSE Growth Commission.
BIS, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2010) Financing a Private
Sector Recovery.
Davis, Steven J., Faberman, Jason, Haltiwanger, John (2006) The flow approach
to labor markets: new data sources and micro–macro links, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 20, pp.3–26.
Davis, Steven J., Haltiwanger, John (1992) Gross job creation, gross job destruction,
and employment reallocation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, pp.819–863.
Davis, Steven J., Haltiwanger, John, Schuh, Scott (1996) Job Creation and Destruc-
tion, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Foster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger, and C.J. Krizan (2002) The Link Between Aggre-
gate and Micro Productivity Growth: Evidence from Retail Trade, NBER Working
Paper No. 9120.
Franklin, Jeremy, May Rostom and Gregory Thwaites (2015) The banks that said
no: banking relationships, credit supply and productivity in the United Kingdom,
21
Bank of England Staff Working Paper No.557.
Gal, Peter N. (2013) Measuring Total Factor Productivity at the Firm Level us-
ing OECD-ORBIS, OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1049, OECD
Publishing.
Galindo, Antonio, Fabio Schiantarelli, and Andrew Weiss (2007) Does Financial Lib-
eralization Improve the Allocation of Investment? Micro-evidence from Developing
Countries, Journal of Development Economics, 83, pp.562–87.
Gopinath, Gita, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Loukas Karabarbounis and Carolina Villegas-
Sanchez (2017) Capital Allocation and Productivity in South Europe, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 132(4), pp.1915-1967.
Gourio, François, Kashyap, Anil K. (2007) Investment spikes: new facts and a
general equilibrium exploration, Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, Supplement,
pp.1–22.
Herrera, Ana Maria, Marek Kolar, and Raoul Minetti (2011) Credit reallocation,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 58, pp.551–563.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Peter J. Klenow (2009) Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP
in China and India, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4), pp.1403-1448.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Peter J. Klenow (2014) The Life Cycle of Plants in India and
Mexico, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3).
Hyun, Junghwan and Raoul Minetti (2019) Credit Reallocation, Deleveraging, and
Financial Crises, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 51(7), pp.1889-1921.
Mollisi, Vincenzo and Rovigatti, Gabriele (2017) Theory and Practice of TFP Es-
timation: the Control Function Approach Using Stata, CEIS Research Paper 399,
Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
Restuccia, Diego and Richard Rogerson (2008) Policy distortions and aggregate
productivity with heterogeneous establishments, Review of Economic Dynamics,
11, pp.707-720.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2009) On estimating firm-level production functions using
proxy variables to control for unobservables, Economics Letters, 104(3), pp.112-114.
22
Appendix
Table 1: Number of observations










Notes: Sample 1 refers to the sample that conditions on observing the growth of total debt, long-
term debt, short-term debt, and sales. Sample 2 refers to the sample that conditions on observing
the growth of total debt, long-term debt, short-term debt, and sales, as well as default risk, TFP,
and labour productivity.
Table 2: Average Credit Flows and Comparison With Flows of Sales
Average Flows Observations POS NEG NET SUM EXC P
Total Credit (04-12) 248,423 0.185 0.109 0.076 0.294 0.210 0.491
Long Term Credit (04-12) 248,423 0.196 0.109 0.086 0.305 0.211 0.482
Short Term Credit (04-12) 248,423 0.249 0.187 0.062 0.436 0.357 0.441
Sales (04-12) 248,423 0.354 0.150 0.204 0.503 0.238 0.449
Notes: This table conditions on observing the growth of total debt, long-term debt, short-term
debt, and sales, as well as default risk, TFP, and labour productivity.
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